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| ScapeGoat? |
Current news is focused on PFC Manning's trial for "treason" and leaking national security data which in turn, is tied to Julian Assange's revealing those leaks to the world via WikiLeaks.
They want Manning executed, and Assange burned at the stake.
Pseudo-patriotic popinjays now abound, demanding that Manning be tried, convicted, and executed for these gross breaches of security.
We don't doubt there were actual documents of intelligence value in this breach of 700,000+ files, and we should expect that such intelligence information should be protected.
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| Glenn Greenwald: FOIA Guy |
We don't doubt there were actual documents of intelligence value in this breach of 700,000+ files, and we should expect that such intelligence information should be protected.
Then again, much of what was released consisted of reports of questionable military operations, while others were diplomatic cables commenting on corrupt local politicians and/or calling them "blithering idiots" or "horses' asses".
All damning information; well, at least, embarrassing.
But, we won't go into the issue of whether most of those documents, which were State Department dispatches, should have been classified at all, or likely carried notices beyond "FOUO/LIMDIS'
[For Official Use Only/Limited Distribution].
We're still waiting for investigations into the Oval Office leaks which released sensitive intelligence information on methods and sources used in covert operations in Yemen, or the numerous other White House leaks on intelligence operations.
There is also that little matter of former CIA Director [and SecDef] Leon Panetta's disclosure of TSC operational details to Hollywood reps during the creation/filming of the film
"Zero Dark Thirty".
All damning information; well, at least, embarrassing.
But, we won't go into the issue of whether most of those documents, which were State Department dispatches, should have been classified at all, or likely carried notices beyond "FOUO/LIMDIS'
[For Official Use Only/Limited Distribution].
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| Official Reference Map |
We're still waiting for investigations into the Oval Office leaks which released sensitive intelligence information on methods and sources used in covert operations in Yemen, or the numerous other White House leaks on intelligence operations.
There is also that little matter of former CIA Director [and SecDef] Leon Panetta's disclosure of TSC operational details to Hollywood reps during the creation/filming of the film
"Zero Dark Thirty".
It seems the DOD Inspector General's report was suppressed.
We do wonder how it was that Manning's unit had access to State Department communications;
Hmm.
In 1976, I was assigned the task to assemble an Investigation Team to "assign responsibility and blame" to the newly arrived head librarian of the Forces Command Classified Library at Fort Bragg, NC. It seemed that several thousand highly classified NATO documents had gone missing, and the Command Structure needed a ScapeGoat.
My team thus engaged our investigation, and after a few weeks, we determined the missing documents had been destroyed, piecemeal, by analysts who cut photos of foreign equipment and profiles of foreign military leaders, as well as detailed descriptions of units, personalities, and complex military systems.
c) the Librarian Major would be awarded the Army Meritorious Service Medal for her "exceptional performance in such a brief period, resulting in increased security and highly useful Intelligence references".
We do wonder how it was that Manning's unit had access to State Department communications;
that being the case, would such units have been privy to
all the correspondence between Benghazi and Foggy Bottom?
[Could we retrieve that communications content between Hillary and the US Embassy before/after/during the attack on Benghazi?]
Notably, given this revelation that the security of the US Intelligence Community communications amounted to being slightly more secure than a sieve, the US Intelligence security crowd demanded that WikiLeaks owner, Adrian Assange, be remanded to the US for high treason
-- awkward, since that charge could be levied only against a US citizen, which Assange is not [he's an Aussie living in Ecuador's embassy in London].
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| Exposed by WikiLeaks |
-- awkward, since that charge could be levied only against a US citizen, which Assange is not [he's an Aussie living in Ecuador's embassy in London].
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| Assange: Too gay to rape women |
So, the US persuaded the Swedes to charge Assange with rape [later reduced to "sex allegations"], which was odd, since he is gay; and, we do recognized Sweden is noted for its rather bizarre sexual boundaries -- as portrayed in the popular movie series: "The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo".
Gracious! Weird Sex! in Sweden? Heaven help us!
The Swedes are still atwitter that their monarch has been the subject of "sex allegations"; could Mr Assange and King Gustaf have been co-conspirators, or more?
But, those are minor details when it comes to chest-thumping and covering up a massive security breach caused by an incompetent IT security system in our Intelligence and Military communities
But, we digress.
We are told PFC Manning is a product of today's digital Intelligence world. His security clearance was supposedly based on a background investigation, perhaps even an SBI [Special Background Investigation] for special access to compartmented intelligence!
His accusers allege he was issued a laptop, complete with DVD tray and USB ports, with "Open Source" access to the Internet, in addition to secure intelligence links, and all he needed to do was to enter "keywords" to access the most sensitive data available within the Intelligence Community.
Gracious! Weird Sex! in Sweden? Heaven help us!
The Swedes are still atwitter that their monarch has been the subject of "sex allegations"; could Mr Assange and King Gustaf have been co-conspirators, or more?
But, those are minor details when it comes to chest-thumping and covering up a massive security breach caused by an incompetent IT security system in our Intelligence and Military communities
But, we digress.
His accusers allege he was issued a laptop, complete with DVD tray and USB ports, with "Open Source" access to the Internet, in addition to secure intelligence links, and all he needed to do was to enter "keywords" to access the most sensitive data available within the Intelligence Community.
Supposedly, these transfer mechanisms were authorized for the convenience of sharing information between analysts so that all levels would be equally knowledgeable of critical intelligence. And, even though he downloaded "only" Secret information, the data he accessed and released to the public threatened national security.
Hmm.
That COULD be why the data was classified Secret -- or not.
One critic suggested that all troops in these secure facilities be searched as they departed their operations centers, which of course, would be difficult in a war zone; but, theoretically, that would prevent them from exiting while secreting thumb drives.
Alternately, someone could/should have been monitoring the internet for big downloads of classified data.
But, of course, that is one function of the National Security Agency [lots and lots of employees - but, the exact number is classified], and of the Department of Homeland Security [240,000 strong], and thousands of counter-intelligence agents of each component of the Intelligence and Military Communities; apparently, one of those hundreds of thousands of employees noticed that files classified SECRET were floating around on the Internet.
1) Manning likely had no more than a Secret clearance, and it would seem even that may have been granted at the local level.
One critic suggested that all troops in these secure facilities be searched as they departed their operations centers, which of course, would be difficult in a war zone; but, theoretically, that would prevent them from exiting while secreting thumb drives.
Alternately, someone could/should have been monitoring the internet for big downloads of classified data.
But, of course, that is one function of the National Security Agency [lots and lots of employees - but, the exact number is classified], and of the Department of Homeland Security [240,000 strong], and thousands of counter-intelligence agents of each component of the Intelligence and Military Communities; apparently, one of those hundreds of thousands of employees noticed that files classified SECRET were floating around on the Internet.
The flaws in these arguments:
1) Manning likely had no more than a Secret clearance, and it would seem even that may have been granted at the local level.
He would probably not have had a Top Secret [TS] clearance!
The time consumed for a SBI [Special Background Investigation] is significant since investigating/granting a TS/SCI
clearance/access generally takes longer than PFC Manning's time in
service. It involves in-depth personal interviews with friends, family,
teachers, employers, etc., to gauge the individual's maturity and
responsibility, with the ultimate question being
:
"Would you trust this person with a position of trust and responsibility?"
....a) Based on press reporting, more than a few of those who should have been interviewed in the SBI process stated that candidate Manning had questionable character issues -- leading to an unfavorable adjudication in his clearance review.
....b) But, perhaps those clearance procedures were conducted hastily and electronically, by-passing standard procedures.
....c) I suspect that PFC Manning's clearance adjudication process [normally extensive] may have been circumvented for the "convenience" of his unit, since he was apparently granted access to "only" Secret data. Nonetheless, he gained access to diplomatic correspondence which would/should have required separate access, and a separate review by those granting a "need to know" level of access.
2) Computer Security:
......a) In the early days of desktop and "portable" computers, the security standard was established at the Pentagon as part of DODIIS [DOD Intelligence Information Systems] that the CD/DVD and floppy disk equipment and USB connectors were to be removed from computers operating in secure environments -- to prevent the unauthorized removal of classified data.
......b) I don't recall that those standards were changed.
......c) Analyst exchanges of classified data would thus not take place via CD/DVD/Thumb Drive,
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"Would you trust this person with a position of trust and responsibility?"
....a) Based on press reporting, more than a few of those who should have been interviewed in the SBI process stated that candidate Manning had questionable character issues -- leading to an unfavorable adjudication in his clearance review.
....b) But, perhaps those clearance procedures were conducted hastily and electronically, by-passing standard procedures.
....c) I suspect that PFC Manning's clearance adjudication process [normally extensive] may have been circumvented for the "convenience" of his unit, since he was apparently granted access to "only" Secret data. Nonetheless, he gained access to diplomatic correspondence which would/should have required separate access, and a separate review by those granting a "need to know" level of access.
2) Computer Security:
......a) In the early days of desktop and "portable" computers, the security standard was established at the Pentagon as part of DODIIS [DOD Intelligence Information Systems] that the CD/DVD and floppy disk equipment and USB connectors were to be removed from computers operating in secure environments -- to prevent the unauthorized removal of classified data.
......b) I don't recall that those standards were changed.
......c) Analyst exchanges of classified data would thus not take place via CD/DVD/Thumb Drive,
but rather, would take place on a tiered access
process within a closed network
-- and not via "shoe-leather interface" as some would presume.
[I'm familiar with those IT security requirements since I was part of the team that wrote them based on security studies we developed as far back as 1981 [and again in 1993] as part of an on-going Intelligence Community IT security program -- which, as far as I know, continues to this day.]
The question, of course, is:
-- and not via "shoe-leather interface" as some would presume.
[I'm familiar with those IT security requirements since I was part of the team that wrote them based on security studies we developed as far back as 1981 [and again in 1993] as part of an on-going Intelligence Community IT security program -- which, as far as I know, continues to this day.]
The question, of course, is:
"Were those requirements employed in
PFC Manning's work environment?".
If they were not, the Chain-of-Command
was negligent.
That would include supervisors at his local unit, and adjudicators all the way up the Chain of the Intelligence&Security Command [INSCOM].
Which brings us back to my original comment:
Which brings us back to my original comment:
Who granted Manning a security clearance which would allow a Private to access
Top Secret/Compartmented files!
Why is that officer and Manning's entire command structure not on trial.
"Why have none in PFC Manning's Chain-of-Command been investigated and charged."
"Why have none in PFC Manning's Chain-of-Command been investigated and charged."
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As a footnote:
I take special interest in this story as it brings to mind an incident in which a Military Member was set up as a scapegoat to disguise or divert attention from a crime. At that time, I was officially appointed as the Investigating Officer - a status I took quite seriously as an MI Special Agent. Now, I don't know all the circumstances of PFC Manning's case [I doubt none of those details will ever emerge], but, after review of the published material, I suspect Manning is the Scapegoat to serve as a distraction from a major incident - or Security Breach at a much higher level.
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| Forces Command |
[The Librarian, a Major, was neither attractive nor an Academy graduate - so she was deemed completely expendable!]
We were unable to convince our senior leadership that the Major could not possibly be held responsible for this security breach since she had been assigned to that position only a month before, long after the classified documents went missing.
The response was: "Just create enough evidence to convict her!"
[As I was an Army Brat, I was fully familiar with the "Scapegoating" process which was frequently employed to divert the blame from a culpable West Point (Academy) grad and sacrifice an unwitting and completely innocent non-Academy grad instead - ensuring the Academy grad had no black marks on his record. This innocent Major had no one to protect her, and she would be tossed out of the Army with a dishonorable discharge.
(I watched this happen periodically to Reservists; the Academy cadets global "fraternity" to protect their brethren from negative situations - and/or courts-martial (no matter how heinous their misbehavior - ranging from Rape to Desertion to War Crimes)].
My team thus engaged our investigation, and after a few weeks, we determined the missing documents had been destroyed, piecemeal, by analysts who cut photos of foreign equipment and profiles of foreign military leaders, as well as detailed descriptions of units, personalities, and complex military systems.
The excised materials would then be re-assembled into new classified document layouts to be converted to Order-of-Battle manuals for reference in both tactical and strategic settings.
Once the original [NATO] reference materials were depleted of their usable contents, the scraps were tossed into the shredder with no specific documentation of their disposal - thus no way to track the demise of the original [Classified documents].
[This was a convenient shortcut which analysts used to compensate for not having a [prohibited] Xerox machine in the library; the absence of such a high tech copying machine would have required massive delays in productivity while the analysts instead photographed or manually copied these materials to create new/updated manuals].
I then created a brief report for the leadership, describing this process, thus absolving the Major of any wrong-doing.
The colonel's response was:
"Rewrite your report and make sure she is blamed!"
We were stunned at this response, so we broadened our investigation, and learned that the Major had rebuffed the sexual advances of her superior [or may have, in fact been raped] - who was a general in our chain-of-command. Thus was the impetus to rid the Army of this officer who might besmirch the general's career and promotion potential.
So, I rewrote my report, revising the scenario of the disappearance of the NATO classified documents, concluding that the Major was not at fault, but, rather, that the incompetence of the senior leadership at Forces Command had contributed to the egregious disappearance and total lack of accountability for the missing material.
I addressed the report to the Commanding General at Forces Command, the Army Chief of Staff, plus an information copy would go to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
{I made copies for my Special Agents and suggested they guard them with their lives.}.
I then provided my report, with cover letter to multiple addressees, to the Forces Command colonel who had demanded the bogus charges against the Major.
This time the response was different; the colonel demanded that I revise it.
I commented that I had been charged with conducting the official investigation to determine culpability. I had completed my investigation, and found the Chain of Command culpable, and two generals in that chain as having "major responsibility" for this egregious breach of security which required immediate notification of our NATO allies.
For my insouciance, I found myself [and my team] threatened with charges of insubordination and career-ending notes in our files - and demands that I not forward my latest report. I responded that, I had no choice since my official appointment orders required that my report be complete and forwarded through channels to the most senior command level.
To do otherwise would be dereliction of duty on my part.
After a lengthy discussion with the colonel, with one of my Special Agents taking careful notes, we reached a compromise.
I would shelve my most recent report, and submit my original report as the official version.
In exchange,
a) each member of my team would:
1) be awarded an Army Commendation Medal for their superb investigation;
2) be transferred to an assignment in a location of his choice
3) retain a copy of the shelved report, plus a copy of the notes of the compromise discussion
b) I would return to my position as detachment commander,
[Thus protecting her from any future attempts to denigrate her character or Military Service]
I advised the colonel that, should any member of my team suffer physical or career harm, that copies of the damning report would be distributed to not only the stated addressees, but also to The Washington Post and to the New York Times, creating a
national scandal and likely ending his career, and that of his Academy brethren.
The colonel, and his Academy cohorts, agreed to my terms.
The Librarian Major was bewildered as to why she received such a high award after being in her position for such a short period. [She likely retired many years later, still wondering about that award.]
