China's Trojan Horse got us to disarm and cripple our Government
UPDATE: 02JULY2024
I'm republishing this post given the increasing number of indicators that
China interprets the Biden Administration as a sign of weakness in the US.
Our Military is focusing on accommodating Transgenderism rather then
ensuring Military Readiness; the debate demonstrated Biden's incompetence,
China has increased its harassment of Taiwan [and US Navy ships]
and
there are multiple indicators of Chinese infiltration of the US via our Open Borders
We need to understand history to understand the China Threat.
Start with China's daily threat to Taiwan, then recall the massive
attacks of the Chinese Army during the Korean War:
Ten echelons of Chinese soldiers attacking a US position;
the first nine echelons had fake weapons, causing US
gunners to run out of ammunition - and be over-run.
Today's China not only has 3,170,000 Military personnel,
It also has hi-tech weaponry, to include DEWs on their ships and aircraft
and also based on their satellites.
The Biden Administration is the laughingstock of the world,
and we can assume that both Xi and Putin have noticed.
Will they combine forces to attack the US from both coasts?
The following assessment is drawn from Jane's
"China's Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations"
Executive Summary
[Click here for the full report]
China is prioritizing three military development goals through 2030:
1. The ability to impose unacceptable costs on the access or freedom of maneuver within China’s first and second island chains. This includes the South and East China Seas, as well as the waters out to Guam.
2. The ability to contribute to international commons operations, which China perceives as the responsibilities of a great power.
[This is seen through China’s involvement in the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy task force missions and participation in overseas humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations.]
3. Defending China’s overseas economic interests, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including infrastructure and Chinese nationals overseas
The risk of terrorist activity targeting
Chinese facilities and personnel is likely to be a major driver of People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
expeditionary combat operations through 2030.
In pursuit of these goals, China has pursued both organizational reforms as well as new military capabilities
to aid in expeditionary operations. As part of broader organizational restructuring beginning in 2015, the
PLA created the Logistic Support Department (LSD) and Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF) to better
support joint operations.
The administrative separation of these two organizations divides responsibilities for force management and logistics implementation/operations support, countering corruption, enhancing joint logistics between the services, and better aligning the organizations with Central Military Commission (CMC) strategic planning.
The JLSF manages the implementation of the joint logistics support system, coordinating logistics, personnel, and supplies to theater commands.
Based at Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base (JLSB), the JLSF directs five joint logistics support centers (JLSC) aligned with a specific theater command.
The LSD provides PLA-wide strategic logistics planning, coordinates military-civil fusion, and determines strategic priorities.
Additionally, both the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) are rapidly expanding their offensive and logistical capabilities.
These include the introduction of the PLAN’s
(1) Type 055 destroyers,
(2) Type 075 landing helicopter docks (LHD),
(3) Type 901 fast replenishment ships, and
(4) Indigenously-designed aircraft carriers (including the
(a) Type 002 and future
(b) future Type 003;
(5) as well as the PLAAF’s
(a) Y-20 strategic transport aircraft,
(b) Y-20 tanker variant, and the
(c) J-20 fifth-generation fighter.
Despite these advancements, the PLA is still in the early stages of developing its expeditionary military capabilities - but expanding rapidly
As one defense analyst argued in the South China Morning Post,
“... bigger supply ships were no substitute for more overseas bases when it came to supporting the expanding mission of China’s naval fleets.”
Many of the PLAN’s and PLAAF’s new capabilities help address long-standing deficiencies in expeditionary capabilities – including anti-submarine warfare, maritime air-defense, strategic airlift, and tanker aircraft – but China has not yet had the time to develop the doctrine or experience necessary to maximize their use of these new capabilities.
The PLAN’s primary replenishment capabilities lie in the nine Type 903A ships and two newly introduced
Type 901 fast support ships, which are designed to support Carrier Groups.
Altogether, this auxiliary fleet is capable of supporting approximately 20-30 surface combat ships for 2-3 weeks without replenishment, with the Type 901s also supporting the PLAN’s two Carriers.
PLAN assets would need solid and liquid supplies from foreign civilian ports and/or domestic civilian container ships or tankers for operations exceeding that time period.
The PLAN appears to be pursuing five basic expeditionary logistics models:
(1) Accompanying five (5) replenishment ships, civilian ports, logistics bases, replenishment relays, and civilian underway replenishment (UNREP).
-----
The administrative separation of these two organizations divides responsibilities for force management and logistics implementation/operations support, countering corruption, enhancing joint logistics between the services, and better aligning the organizations with Central Military Commission (CMC) strategic planning.
The JLSF manages the implementation of the joint logistics support system, coordinating logistics, personnel, and supplies to theater commands.
Based at Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base (JLSB), the JLSF directs five joint logistics support centers (JLSC) aligned with a specific theater command.
The LSD provides PLA-wide strategic logistics planning, coordinates military-civil fusion, and determines strategic priorities.
Together the two organizations are responsible for diverse logistics
activities including inventoryand warehousing, medical services, transport, force projection, oil pipelines, engineering and construction management, reserve assets management.
Additionally, both the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) are rapidly expanding their offensive and logistical capabilities.
These include the introduction of the PLAN’s
(1) Type 055 destroyers,
(2) Type 075 landing helicopter docks (LHD),
(3) Type 901 fast replenishment ships, and
(4) Indigenously-designed aircraft carriers (including the
(a) Type 002 and future
(b) future Type 003;
 |
| Y-20 [capacity: 145,000 lbs |
(5) as well as the PLAAF’s
(a) Y-20 strategic transport aircraft,
(b) Y-20 tanker variant, and the
(c) J-20 fifth-generation fighter.
Despite these advancements, the PLA is still in the early stages of developing its expeditionary military capabilities - but expanding rapidly
As one defense analyst argued in the South China Morning Post,
“... bigger supply ships were no substitute for more overseas bases when it came to supporting the expanding mission of China’s naval fleets.”
Many of the PLAN’s and PLAAF’s new capabilities help address long-standing deficiencies in expeditionary capabilities – including anti-submarine warfare, maritime air-defense, strategic airlift, and tanker aircraft – but China has not yet had the time to develop the doctrine or experience necessary to maximize their use of these new capabilities.
 |
| 903A |
Altogether, this auxiliary fleet is capable of supporting approximately 20-30 surface combat ships for 2-3 weeks without replenishment, with the Type 901s also supporting the PLAN’s two Carriers.
PLAN assets would need solid and liquid supplies from foreign civilian ports and/or domestic civilian container ships or tankers for operations exceeding that time period.
The PLAN appears to be pursuing five basic expeditionary logistics models:
(1) Accompanying five (5) replenishment ships, civilian ports, logistics bases, replenishment relays, and civilian underway replenishment (UNREP).
(2) The PLAN and PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) may be developing the capability to conduct organic
amphibious combat operations in the model of a US Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
(3) The
PLANMC has expanded to over 30,000 personnel in the last few years because of transfers from the PLA
Army. Without foreign air bases and with limited aircraft carriers,
(4) China has a limited capability to project
airpower beyond limited amphibious operations using its Type 075 LHD, Type 075s,
(5) in conjunction with
Type 071 Landing Platform Docks (LPD) and other, smaller landing ships, may be able to conduct limited
amphibious operations overseas,
[but a lack of rotary wing assets (due in part to competition for capabilities with the PLA ground forces) will severely limit PLANMC amphibious assault capabilities at least until 2030.]
Chinese analysts note that strategic airlift allows militaries to rapidly respond to emerging conflicts overseas, whereas naval power projection is significantly slower.
The Y-20, China’s new strategic transport aircraft, will significantly expand PLAAF expeditionary capacity by providing a rapid-reaction transport lift capability, but the lack of overseas airbases means that China will need to rely on civilian airports at least through the short term.
Chinese military analysts increasingly note the importance of military-civil fusion (军民融合) for expeditionary operations as well as China’s BRI interests.
China released several technical standards and laws beginning in 2015 that are designed to further military-civil fusion, including capabilities such as rollon/roll-off and container ships.
The PLAAF has also conducted exercises with civilian cargo aircraft companies so that these organizations can support expeditionary military operations if required.
In fact, Chinese companies already have experience supporting some non-combatant evacuation and HA/DR operations. While these capabilities have important limitations, particularly in their utility during armed conflicts, coordination with the military command and control network, and in meeting military construction standards, they are nevertheless capable of supplementing PLA capabilities for operations short of armed conflict and fulfilling an emergency reserve function.
Through 2030, China’s expeditionary capabilities appear primarily aimed at supporting the second and third goals above – the participation in international commons operations and the protection of overseas economic investments.
Critically, although the PLA will likely be challenged to sustain overseas combat operations or operations in hostile countries through 2030, China is nevertheless rapidly developing capabilities necessary to disrupt US interests in the Middle East, Africa, and throughout Asia.
China’s existing overseas operations in the Red Sea provide it with valuable experience and opportunities to develop expeditionary concepts of operations (CONOPS).
The United States should monitor signs that China’s overseas capabilities and/or goals have shifted, such as
1) The deployment of the PLAN’s Type 901 fast replenishment ship, Type 075 LHD, or Type 055 destroyer on overseas operations (particularly Gulf of Aden missions)
[but a lack of rotary wing assets (due in part to competition for capabilities with the PLA ground forces) will severely limit PLANMC amphibious assault capabilities at least until 2030.]
Chinese analysts note that strategic airlift allows militaries to rapidly respond to emerging conflicts overseas, whereas naval power projection is significantly slower.
The Y-20, China’s new strategic transport aircraft, will significantly expand PLAAF expeditionary capacity by providing a rapid-reaction transport lift capability, but the lack of overseas airbases means that China will need to rely on civilian airports at least through the short term.
Chinese military analysts increasingly note the importance of military-civil fusion (军民融合) for expeditionary operations as well as China’s BRI interests.
China released several technical standards and laws beginning in 2015 that are designed to further military-civil fusion, including capabilities such as rollon/roll-off and container ships.
The PLAAF has also conducted exercises with civilian cargo aircraft companies so that these organizations can support expeditionary military operations if required.
In fact, Chinese companies already have experience supporting some non-combatant evacuation and HA/DR operations. While these capabilities have important limitations, particularly in their utility during armed conflicts, coordination with the military command and control network, and in meeting military construction standards, they are nevertheless capable of supplementing PLA capabilities for operations short of armed conflict and fulfilling an emergency reserve function.
Through 2030, China’s expeditionary capabilities appear primarily aimed at supporting the second and third goals above – the participation in international commons operations and the protection of overseas economic investments.
Critically, although the PLA will likely be challenged to sustain overseas combat operations or operations in hostile countries through 2030, China is nevertheless rapidly developing capabilities necessary to disrupt US interests in the Middle East, Africa, and throughout Asia.
China’s existing overseas operations in the Red Sea provide it with valuable experience and opportunities to develop expeditionary concepts of operations (CONOPS).
The United States should monitor signs that China’s overseas capabilities and/or goals have shifted, such as
1) The deployment of the PLAN’s Type 901 fast replenishment ship, Type 075 LHD, or Type 055 destroyer on overseas operations (particularly Gulf of Aden missions)
2) Pre-positioning of ordnance abroad, particularly at the Djibouti logistics support facility.
3) An increase in the Type 901 or Type 903A’s ability to transport solid cargo (for UNREP of
ordnance)
4) An increase in the number of helicopters – for anti-submarine warfare, tactical transport, or attack –
available to the PLAN and PLANMC
5) An expansion in the number of Type 901 fast replenishment ships
6) The establishment of a military logistics facility for aerial replenishment or the frequent use of a
foreign airfield
The PLA’s actual fixed overseas footprint may continue to remain light until approximately 2030 because it can still rely on civilian infrastructure and platforms to support its expeditionary operations.
However, after 2030, the PLA will likely pursue more dedicated military bases beyond its existing Djibouti Logistics Support Base.
The PLAN and PLAAF’s capabilities in 2035 would theoretically allow the PLA to perform higher level overseas combat operations, but operations in contested environments will almost assuredly require overseas military facilities or, at the least, preferred access to both ports and airfields in friendly countries.
Further, the PLA will still likely have limited capability to conduct operations in hostile countries [e.g., USA] with integrated air defense systems without support from future PLAN aircraft carriers. This may be difficult for the PLA given slowing economic growth and defense budgets.
The PLA’s actual fixed overseas footprint may continue to remain light until approximately 2030 because it can still rely on civilian infrastructure and platforms to support its expeditionary operations.
However, after 2030, the PLA will likely pursue more dedicated military bases beyond its existing Djibouti Logistics Support Base.
The PLAN and PLAAF’s capabilities in 2035 would theoretically allow the PLA to perform higher level overseas combat operations, but operations in contested environments will almost assuredly require overseas military facilities or, at the least, preferred access to both ports and airfields in friendly countries.
Further, the PLA will still likely have limited capability to conduct operations in hostile countries [e.g., USA] with integrated air defense systems without support from future PLAN aircraft carriers. This may be difficult for the PLA given slowing economic growth and defense budgets.
