"Wassenaar will make resistance via the Internet impossible!" |
This is another in our series of guest posts by subject matter experts. This post relates to a new threat to internet security and freedom of expression.
Open Letter Regarding
Wassenaar to the Department of Commerce and to Legislators,
Posted on May 26, 2015
[Background:
The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technology is a
multilateral export control regime [MECR] with 41 participating states, to
include the USA. Wassenaar replaces
COCOM [Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls], and is ostensibly less strict than COCOM
and focuses primarily on the transparency of national export controls and not
granting veto power to individual members over organizational decisions.
Wassenaar has come under fire from the IT
community since, in its current form, it will have “extensive harmful effects
on computer security research and defensive software”, potentially imposing
criminal penalties on software and security developers. The very credible author of this
article: Jonathan Adziarski, provides a
stirring case against Wassenaar.]
To Whom it May
Concern,
I am a published and
respected forensics expert who pioneered the very first forensic techniques to
extract data from the iPhone as early as 2008. Since then, I have spent
several years, and much of my time, assisting numerous law enforcement and
military agencies around the world, including our own. I’ve trained government
agencies in the US, Canada, and the UK, and I've trained law enforcement organizations from dozens of
our allies here at home in the US.
My work has been
validated by the NIJ/NIST. I have invested my time in providing free assistance
to many US-based federal and state agencies who have flown personnel into my
small town for help in the middle of the night.
Because of my
research and hard work, I’ve provided the necessary information to the rest of
the industry to be able to perform iOS forensics, and a vast majority of
today’s forensics solutions are founded upon my techniques.
I did all of this on
my own personal time, and in many cases on my own dime. The tools and
techniques I developed are by no means “intrusion”
tools; however, due to the excessively broad nature of the Wassenaar proposal, my services would fall under its regulations as
they bypass security mechanisms of devices and collect information from them.
As all of my research is done personally, I have no large company with lawyers
to address the impossible spider web of export regulations that would be
introduced by Wassenaar.
The current proposal,
as is, would harm far more than simply the information security industry, but would
also greatly damage the forensics industry and ultimately limit the quality of
tools available to law enforcement agencies for conducting lawful forensics. My
tools, as well as many commercial solutions, employ the use of exploits to
collect information from devices for purposes that serve law enforcement and
the greater good.
I sometimes only
privately release the source code to my own tools, as many commercial forensics
manufacturers have stolen it in the past, yet I continue to help the law enforcement
community. Wassenaar will do little
to accomplish the goals it set out to, and instead make it impossible for
security researchers like myself to further expand the base of knowledge by
contributing openly to the community – which goes far beyond this country’s
borders.
Had Wassenaar (as it is proposed today) been
in place in 2008, I would not have felt as though I could openly share my
research publicly without risk of prosecution, which would have deprived the
community as a whole – including the United States – of valuable information
that has led to the greater good.
I understand there
are certain nation states misusing intrusion tools to commit crimes. There are
also many law enforcement agencies within the United States who have misused or
abused my own tools and techniques to conduct questionable and potentially
illegal intrusions. We cannot simply un-invent technologies to prevent their
misuse, and unlike nuclear weapons, digital goods cannot be effectively
regulated; yet this is the tradeoff we make, to create these tools for the
greater good, knowing they may be abused.
This proposal stands
to only damage those looking to contribute to a better and more secure
community. Wassenaar has a deterrent
component, and at the heart of security research are many independent
researchers like myself who will simply stop contributing if there is a fear of
prosecution simply for sharing knowledge in the form of code.
Sharing knowledge is
not only a basic human right, but the only means by which we can become a
civilized society. Without knowledge and education, the greater good suffers.
Security researchers
share knowledge in the form of code, which serves as an illustration – a
description – of a problem that exists in a system. Even many published papers
will contain code as it is our language by which we can most effectively
communicate an idea. In addition to code, we create binaries of it to help test
our own systems for vulnerabilities and ensure the security of our user base. Wassenaar,
at its very core, attempts to regulate the ideas and knowledge we communicate
through code.
Dept of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security |
In Wassenaar’s attempt to prevent the dissemination of intrusion software, it is, at the very core, creating too much of a fear of prosecution to any security researcher to even consider developing or sharing their research with those who would most benefit from it.
There are
alternatives to dealing with malicious nation states that do not involve creating
regulations and the fear of prosecution on honest, law abiding researchers
whose focus should be on their work, and not on being imprisoned by their own
country.
The day that I am prevented from sharing my knowledge freely with the world is also the day I stop sharing with all; it is the day the US declares they own the rights to my knowledge and what I do with it. That kind of power is far more dangerous than any intrusion tool.
The day that I am prevented from sharing my knowledge freely with the world is also the day I stop sharing with all; it is the day the US declares they own the rights to my knowledge and what I do with it. That kind of power is far more dangerous than any intrusion tool.